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There's a lot less there than meeß the ge.
-an0nyil0ur-
The argument For allowing
insurance companies accused of
bad faith to have iuries compare
their conduct with that of their
aggrieved insureds or third-party
claimants sounds good enough to
be the product of an insurance
advertiser's focus group. The Cali-
foniacourt, in Kutght u. Jewett,l sud
of comparative fault in general:
...the "comparative fault"
doctrine is a flexible, com-
monsense concept, under
which a jury properþ may
consider and evaluate the
relative responsibility of var-
ious parties fot an iniury
(whether their responsibility
for the injury rests on negli-
gence, strict liability, or
other theories of responsi-
bility), in order to anive zt
an "equitable . . . apportion-
ment or allocation of loss".
As a promoter of corîplra-
tive fault for insurance, i.e., de-
fense of compatatle bad faith and
reverse bad faith claims, has said,
'T{olding insurers wholly liable for
damages fot which they are only
patly responsible, while allowing
the insured to recovet for self-
inflicted harm, offends all notions
of equity and fairness."2
The fact is, in insurance bad
faith claims, comparative fault, and
reverse bad faith are groundless
concepts that should not survive
plaintiffls motions to strike or dis-
miss. When the specter of compar-
ative bad faith defense andf or re-
verse bad faith claims arise, coun-
sel shouldbe aware of some excel-
'fhe unsung Stephens u. Safeco
case
Stephens u. Safeco is a good
starting point. Tom and Jodie
Stephens owned Buster's Body
Shop in Hamil¡on when it suffered
an accidental fire in 1987. Disputes
arose when they tried to settle their
claims under their fire policy with
Safeco, so they sued Safeco for
violations of the duty of good farth
zrrÅfur dealing and for violation of
the MontanaUnfak Claims Settle-
ment Practices Act. Safeco was
successful in injecting L compa'rt-
tive bad faith defense into the
pleadings by taking the position
that Stephens also owed Safeco a
duty of good faith and fm dealing.
The jury was asked on a special
verdict form, 'Did plaintiffs violate
any duty of good futh and fair
dealing owed to Safeco?" to which
the they responded 'Yes" on an
11-1 vote. Having concluded that
both parties violated the duty of
good faith and faþ dealing and
allocated causal conduct 530/o to
plarntiffs and 47 7o to Safeco, the
jury awarded $38,333.33 to Tom
Stephens for emotional distress.
Consequentl¡ plaintiffs recovery
was barred by Montana's compara-
tive neglþnce statute, MC¡, S 27-
r-702.
On appeal, the Montana
Supreme Court held that there
could not be comparative bad faith
where the first-pafty claimant ù-
leged insurer bad faith tort. Justice
McDonough's succinct and clear
analysis noted first that, in 1983,
the court, in L)pintki a. Title In¡.
Co.,u rccognized that the insurance
company's duty to act in good faith
with their insureds existed inde-
pendent of the insurance coritract
and independent of statute. He
pointed out tha! on the other
hand, Storyt u. Ciyt of Borynaí had,
held that, absent a "specia) lrla-
tionship," bteach of a contract did
not result in the tort of bad faith.
IIe noted that Story set five criteria
for determining a "special relation-
ship" such as inherently unequal
bargaining position of the patties,
superior position of one par6¡, and
vulnerability of the other party.
McDonough applied the Story crte-
ria in StEhens u. Safeco and deter-
mined that the insurance compâny
there was in a superior positìon and
orved the insured a" tort duty of
good faith. For Justice Mc-
Donough, in StEhens u. Safeco, the
clear import of Storl was that the
insurer was in the superior position
to owe the duty, and the insured
did not. As the court said in Srorlt,
"The tort of bad faith ...serves to
discourage oppression in contracts
INsunnNcE CoNsuMER CouNspr-ts Cor,uMN
Dnrvrxc Tnn Stere INr:o Tne Coupenerrvp
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lent precedent from Montana and
Cùiforna which should put them
to rest. Judge Molloy recently
struck the comparative bad faith
defense in Burton u. Mountain I[/e$
Fønz Bureaa Muhta/ In¡ørance Com-
pr.J .In doing so, he relied in part
on the Montana Supreme Court's
1993 decision in StEhens u. Safeco
Int. Co.,a a" càse that has not re-
ceived much attention in Montana
but was a significant factor in the
Califotrna Supreme Court's recent
decision in Krønsco u. Anerican Em-
pire Surplus Lines In¡. Co.s in which
that court dealt comp anttve l¡ad
futh a death blow in that state. It
is worth reviewing each of these
decisions to see the holes in the
legal theory of compatztle fault in
insurance bad faith.
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which necessarily give one party 
^superior position."t Consequently,
while the insurer's conduct in the
special relationship can lead to bad
faith, the insured's conduct can
only amount to breach of a con-
tnct and not to bad faith tort.
Safeco argued rn Stephens
that Marte/ u. Montana Power Com-
paryl' authorized comparison of
different levels of conduct so as to
allow comparison of the insured's
conduct with that of the insurer.
Recall that Derenbelger a. Iotty,to
had forbidden comparison of dif-
ferent degrees of tort conduct, so
that for instance, an insurer ac-
cused of willful or wanton miscon-
duct could not seek comparison of
the insured's ordinary negligence.
In Marlel, the court overturned
Derenbergr sayingtt
We hold, therefore, that all
forms of conduct amount-
ing to neglþnce in arry
form including but not lim-
ited to ordinary neglþnce,
gross neglþnce, willful neg-
ligence, wanton mis conduct,
reckless conduc! and heed-
less conduct, zfe to be
compared with any conduct
that falls short of conduct
intended to cause injury or
damage.
Flowever, t-]lre Stephens murt
noted that in Mørtel they compared
tort conduct to tort conduct.l2 In
Stephens, they refused to allow com-
parison of the insured's breach of
contract with the insurance com-
pariy's tort conduct, describing
those "two distinctive legal con-
cepts as to liabiliçy and damages"
asl'apples and oranges."tu
Californiats Ktansco case
Many lawyers today recall a,
time when we relied almost entirely
on California cases when arguing
insurance matters before Montana's
Montana
Pattern
il
.i
,'! ìiq**åç*
fnstruct¡ons
The Montana Supreme Court
Commission on Civil Jury lnstructions
(MPl) is committed to developing and
maintaining the best poss¡ble set of
pattern instructions. MPI welcomes
suggestions from attorneys, especially
in developing areas of the law or in
areas where there are presenfly no
published pattern instructions.
lf you have suggestions,
please contact:
Douglas J. Wold, Chairman
Montana Pattern Instructions
P.O. Box 400
Polson, MT 59860
406-883-2500
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Supreme Court. In June 2000, the
California Supreme Couft relied on
Montana's Stepherc u. Safeco in de-
ciding Kran¡co u. Americm Enpirv
Surþtus Line¡ Ins. Co.,to a landmark
case in that state. Kransco began
when a Wisconsin jury shocked
California toy maker, Kransco, and
its insurers, American Empire Sur-
plus Lines (ÁES) and International
Insurance Company, by awarding a
pLttially
quadriplegic
plaintiff fi2.3
million in com-
pens atory
damages and
$1,0 million in
punitive dam-
ages. Kransco
and its insurers had rejected plain-
tiffls offer to settle for $750,000,
offering instead $450,000. The
plaint-iffl Michael Hubert, was an
adult who broke his neck when he
jumped head first onto a bacþard
water slide toy known as a Slip-
and-Slide. Of importance is the
fact fhzt, during discovery in the
underþing case, Kransco had an-
swered interrogatories wrongly
denying knowledge of any adult
cervical injuries on the Slip-and-
Slide wher¡ in fact, a product
vice president knew of one case
involving death and another of
quadriplegia. Plaintiffs counsel al-
luded to those discovery lapses
during the trial which ended in the
$12.3 million iury verdict.
Kransco sued AES alleging -
breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing for rejecting
plaintiffs offer to settle within lim-
its when there was a substantial
risk of a verdict geatdy in excess
of the limits. ,{ES alleged that
Kransco failed to take ordinary
care for its own safety and that its
neglþnce was the cause of the
loss and damaç at tÅaJ. The basis
for AES's contention was that
Kransco had wrongly answered the
discovery and that the it.y
punished that conduct. Flowever,
Kransco corrected the information
many months before trial, and ÂES
knew, during negotiations before
trial, of the lapse, its correction,
and ptesumably its potential
impoft at tnù.
At the bad faith trial in Cali-
fornia, the court instructed the iury
in "comparative bad faith" assert-
...the court confirmed that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing "is a two-way street"
that also runs from insured to insurer.
that the duty of good faith znd fnr
dealing "is a two-way street" that
also runs from insured to insurer.
Flowever, the court noted that,
based on the "special relationship,"
the insurer's breach is a tort, while
the insured's is contractual only.
Citingthe Montana Supreme Court
"apples and oranges" quote from
StEhens u. Safeco, the California
Supreme Court refused to allow
comparative bad
faith to be used
as an affirmatwe
defense in 
^ninsured's action
against its in-
surer for b ad
faith. In doing
so, the court over-
ruled Caliþmia Casualry Cen. Ins.
Co. a. Søperior Courft which had
been the seminal California case
recognizing "comparative bad
fùth" as a form of comparative
fault in an insurance bad faith case.
The court reasoned that the Cølifor-
niø Casualry case would not with-
stand the scrutiny of cases distin-
guishing Ln insurer's tortious
breach of the covenant of good
faith from an insured's breach of
contract. As the court said, "the
Califotnz Casualty court's holding
is grounded on the faulty premise
that the obligations of insurer and
insured-and thus their bad faith-
arc compatzble. They 
^te 
not."76
The court noted that insurers
have adequate remedies for the
insured's breaches. For example,
the insured's misconduct may be
used to avoid insurer liability for
bad faith by showing that the in-
surer acted reasonably under the
circumstances. Or, the insured's
breach may be actionable as a
breach of contract, and the insurer
may simply avoid coverage on the
basis of material misrepresentation
or breach of wauanLy.
The Kransco court also held it
error to instruct in comparative
ing that the covenant of good faith
and fafu dealing applied to both the
insurer and the insured, and that, if
Kransco did arrything that would
injure AES's right to receive the
benefits of the insurance agree-
ment, Krartsco's recovery would
be proportionately reduced by
comparative fault attributable to it.
The court also instructed in com-
pantwe neglþnce to the effect
that arry neglþnce of Kransco in
preparing for trial, which negli-
gence was a câuse of the dzmage
verdict in Hubert u. Kransco, would
reduce Kransco's recovery against
AES in proportion to the amount
of fault attributable to Kransco.
The iury in the bad faith trial as-
sessed compensatory darnzges at
$L3.6 million and found Kransco
90o/o at fault for its own damages.
Flowever, on post-trial motions,
the trial court concluded it had
erred in instructing on either theory
of comparative fault: comparative
bad faith or comparative negli-
gence. The Court of Appezl af-
firmed the trial court in this, and
the issues of comparative bad faith
and comparative neglþnce went
to the CùifornzSupreme Court.
There, the court confirmed
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neglþnce. The court said that a
third-party insurer is not shielded
from "full responsibility for its bad
faith failure to settle a case even if
the insured's litìgation misconduct
or mishandling of the claim in-
flated the size of the verdic! al-
though as noted, evidence of such
misconduct may support contract
defenses, cross claims or separate
causes of action for breach of the
terms of the insurance contract
otherwis e av ailable."l1
Judge Mosk, in his concur-
ring opinion, succinctly stated the
reason for saddling only the insurer
with the risk of bad faith tort in the
breach of insurance contracts:18
We have done so in order to
extend to individual insureds
in individual cases against in-
dividual insurers the remedies
of the law of torts, which are
broader and deeper than
those of the law of contracts.
And we have done that in
order to attempt to true the
balance in the relationship be-
tween insurers and insureds
generally in the wodd a;tlmge
a balarrce that we have
found to be skewed in fzvot
of insurers and against
insureds 
- 
by providing
further deterrents against
nonperformarrce on the part
of insurers to the detriment
of insureds.
As a result of the Kransco
case, the defenses of comparative
bad faith and comparative negli-
gence in bad faith actions arc dead
inCahfonia.
Federal Judge Molloy's Bufton
v. Mountain lVest case
Judge Molloy confronred the
compantive fault insurance de-
fenses in Burlon u. Mourutain lYest
Farm Bureau Mutuøl Ins. Co. which
he decided on November 15, 2000.
Michael Burton was a passenger
injured in an auto driven by Bonnie
Truscott and insured by Mountain
West. Burton settled his third-paty
claims against Truscott and then
brought first- and third-party
claims against Mountain West. As
z fitst-pafty "insured," he alleged
that Mountain West failed to in-
form him that the $5,000 limits of
Medical Pay coverage available on
three other cars owned by their
insured, Truscott, were potentially
avulat¡Ie to him under "stacking."
By way of third-party claim, Bur-
ton alleged the carrier ultimately
required him to agree that zny
stacked medical pay coverages
would be an advance against his
recovery as a third-pafly claimznt
and also failed to promptly and
fairly investigate and settle his
claim. Mountain West answered
the common law insutance bad
faith claim with an affirmative de-
fense of compantle bad faith.
At this point, it is necessary
to recall a bit of history of insur-
ance bad faith law in Montana:
Remember that the legislature, in
L987, codified first-party and third-
party causes of action against in-
surers in an attempt to do away
with common law bad faith."
F{owever, the Montana Supreme
Court, in Brewington u. Employrc Fire
lns, C0.," subsequently held that
the statute's prohibition on "any
other theory or cause of action"
(referring to common law bad
faith) did not preempt common
law claims for third-party bad faith
but did for first-party. Accordingl¡
Mountain West contended that,
since passenger Burton was a first-
parry "insured" under the Medical
Pay coverage, he could not bring a
common law bad faith claim in any
event. However, Mountain West
also contended that both the first-
p^tty and third-party claims
sounded in tort so as to invoke
their affirmative defense seeking
to compare some conduct of But-
ton. Burton moved to strike the
defense.
From the start,Judge Molloy
seemed bothered by the fivzy
catch-all nature of the comparative
bad faith defense being raised. He
, ,27
s alcl:
Mountain West's second af-
firmative defense blends the
doctrine of contributory or
comparative negliçnce, the
concept of an affirmative de-
fense, and the reciprocal na-
ture of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. The mixhrre
of these three things does not
sit well with the court.
Judge Molloy pointed our
that the essence of the doctrine o[
comparative negligence is that
plaintiff caused his own injuries
and not that plaintiff breached a
duty owed defendant. Mountain
ì7est argued not that Burton
caused his injudes, but that his
misconduct influenced Mountain
West so as to give it the
"reasonable basis in law or fzct"
which provides an insurer a stalu-
tory defense to an "independent
action" allowable under MC,q, S33-
18-242. Accordingl¡ Judge Molloy
struck Mountain West's compàra-
tive bad faith defense, on the
ground that the statutory
"reasonable basis in law or fzct"
defense was adequate, and the
comparative bad faith defense in-
appropriate. The judge further
asserted that, if Mountain West
contended Burton's misconduct
injured it, it could file a counter-
claim which would necessarily en-
tail a showing that Burton owed
the insurer a duty the breach of
which was the proximate cause of
damages to the insurer and v¡hich
damages it would have to prove.
Was tuedeman v. National
.Fatmets UnÍon a comparative
fault case?
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Interestingl¡ Juedenan u. Na-
tional Farwer¡ Union PmPerfl dY Ca-
sualg, C0.," is cited as an example
of a case in which the Montana
Supreme Court "effectively recog-
nized comparatwe fault when it
\¡/as not so described."23 In Juede-
ma.ft, 
^ 
child passenger in a vehicle
driven by Bennyhoff was iniured
so severely as to merit Payment of
the liability policy limits in settle-
ment of his claim. His mother
made the demand but refused to
release the insured defendant from
apotential claim for loss of consor-
tium. Consequentl¡ the insurer
refused to tender payment. In the
resulting bad faith claim brought
by the claimants, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the
insurer. The Montana Supreme
Court upheld the iudgmeflt, rel-
sorung that claimant's conduct in
refusing to agree to a release in
return for payment of the limits of
the policy 'þrevented Farmers
Union from effectuattnga prompt,
fur and equitable settlement."'"
Juednman was subsequently
overnrled on its core holding re-
garding plaintiffs refusal to sign a
release. In l{/atTers u. Cuaranþt Na-
tional lns. Co.," the court held it to
be bad faith for an insuter in a. clezr
liability "limits" case to condition
settlement on execution of a full
and final release. The Jøedernan case
contains no discussion of any con-
cept of compatative fault, has not
been recognized in Montana as
authority fot any comparative fault
defense, and would be weak au-
thority given that fhe \l/atTers deci-
sion overnrled its holding on the
propriety of making the claimant
sþ a full release where liability is
clear and the limits inadequate.
tuedenan aside, reflection
on the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in Stephew u. Safeco and
Judge Molloy's decision in Burton
u. Mountain lT/est indicztes that
the proverbial stake has been
driven through the heart of
"compatatíve bad faith" in both
fìrst and third-party actions
against insurers in Montana. For
the "independent cause of ac-
tion" under MCA 533-18-242,
the insurer is given the
"reasonable basis in law or fact"
defense for denying the claim,
and comparative fault concepts
of comparative bad faith ot com-
parative negligence a,re not
provided in the statute. The coutts
have simply found such comparative
fault concepts inapptopriate fi¡t
cases involvinginsurer bad faith.
The fate of ssreverse bad faith"
claims
A good horror show often
ends with a hint that the monster
might still be alive providing the
possibility of a sequel. Ever cre-
ative insurets, when reading Judge
Molloy's reference to their re-
course of counterclaiming against
the insured, if they can prove his
duty, breach, cause and damage,
might be expected to assert that
"reverse bad faith" is alive. In the
insurance context, "reverse bad
faith'is defined as tortious breach
of the correnani of good faith and
fair dealing by the insured such as
to provide a claìm for relief to the
insurer.'u The California Appel-
late Court recently treated this
specter to wol fbane in Agricultural
Ins. Co. u. Superior Coart."' The
reasoning, quoted in Kransco, will
sound familiar:28
An insurer has no claim
against its insured in toft for
breach of the covenant of
good faith and fm dealing.
Â breach of this covenant is,
at base, a breacÌr ofcontract.
'{. relationship including spe-
cialized circumstances of re-
liance and dependence is
necessaqF to transmute such
a contractual breach into a
tort. Such circumstances do
not exist in the context of an
insured's responsibilities to-
ward its insurer, or in the
reciprocal context of an in-
surer's legitimate expecta-
tions from its insured .
Ilence an insured does not
bear a risk of affirrr.ztive
tort liability for failing to
perform the panoply of in-
definite but fiduciary-like
oblþations contained within
the concept of "insurance
bad fairh."
In fact, reverse bad faith has re-
ceived 
^ 
poor reception in most
appellate courts. Douglas Rich-
mond, a proponent of reverse bad
faith, after reviewing the reported
decisions in a laut review article in
7996, reported that "no appellate
court has published a decision rec-
ognizing reverse bad fzith as a
cause of action absent a statute
conferring the right to bring such a
clttm."2e (R.eferring to court recog-
nition of z clairr, based on a Ten-
nessee statute.) While juries have
been instructed in teverse bad faith
and even returned verdicts, the ap-
pellate courts reject the cause of
action. Neveftheless, the insurer is
not without recourse and has such
claims fot relief as fraud and
breach of contract to remedy the
insuted's misconduct. In the Agri-
cultural Ins. Co. u. Superior Court
case, even though the appellate
court sustained the demurrer to the
reverse bad fairh claim, it set aside
the trial court's order sustaining
the demurrer to the fraud claim.
The court said:30
...an insuted must not de-
fraud in making a clzim
under the policy. When an
insured makes a claim to its
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insurer, the insurer's duty to investigate is trþ
gered. If, because of the insured's false factual
assertions, the insurer incurs expenses that
would otherwise not have been necessary, jus-
tifiable detrimental reliance can be pleaded by
the insurer. ,A.lthough a mere inflated opinion
of a claim's value is not fraud, deliberately false
fac¡nl, asserLions can be fraud. There is a signiû-
cant distinction between â mere agressive
claims position and an outrigþt factual fraud.
Conclusion
Under Montana case law and the lJnfaL Claims
Settlement Practices 
'{.ct31, it is the insurance com-pany that, because of its special relationship, must
meet certain duties in the handling of claims. The
first-party clztmant need only meet the notice and
claim requirements of the insurance policy, and both
fitst- and third-parties must not defraud in making
the claim. If the insured or third-pafty clzimant
brings abzd fertth claim against the insure r, Çorrrpata-
tive fault concepts such as comparative bad faith and
comparative negligence have no legal basis in
Montana. Consequently, an affumative defense of
comparative bad faith should be the subject of a
successful motion to strike.
In Montana, a reverse bad faith tort claim
should fall in the face of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a clitrr. upon which relief can be
granted. Insofar as Montana courts rccognze any
covenant on the paú of an insured for good faith and
fir dezlìng it is entirely 
^ 
crearture of the insurance
contract, and its breach is a contract breach that
won't support a tort claim for reverse bad faith and
cannot be subject to comparative fault defenses such
as comparative bad fzirh or neglþnce. Stephens u.
Safeco and Burton u. Mountøin lY/est in Montana and
Kran¡co u. Arzerican Enpire and Agricaltural In¡. Co. a.
SuþeriorCourtinCalifonia all express a consistent and
well reasoned approach to dealing with the defenses
of compantsve bad faith or comparative neglþnce in
a bzd fairh claim. Those defenses and the tort claim
of reverse bad faith, like werervolves and vampires,
are but scary illusions and should be struck by trial
courts when they Lppear. 
'{.fter editing this, Pat
Sheehy said that they ate really more like the pod
persons in the movie, Nzght of the L-iuing Dead. '\ou
can kill them many times, but they just keep coming
back under some other guise. It would be nice if the
consumer's bar could just find these defenses in their
'pod person' stage and get them all then. But fhat's a
different movie."
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MTLA MeMBERs Er,BcrBr Fon Punrrc SBnvrcB
Voters in the 2000 elections put
their trust in several MIT-A members.
Montana's voters. elected MTLA
members to two statewide positions
and to four legislative seats.
Patricia Cotter was' elected as
an Associate Justice of the Montana
Supreme Couft. Pat is a past mem-
ber of the MTLA Board and for-
merly chaired MTLÂ's ,\micus
Committee. Justice Cotter was
elected to the seat vacated by the
retiring Justice William Hunt.
John Morrison was elected as
Monana's State Auditor and Com-
missioner of Insurance. John is a
past president of MTI-A. Monison
brings to his office years of expedence
representìng the interests of con-
srrrners in insurance related disputes.
Four MTLA members were
elected to seâts in the Montana
House of Representatives. The
perspective they can bring to the "
House is much welcomed. The
MTLA members elected and their
MTLA pertinent committee assþ-
meflts are: Dave Gallik of Helena,
Business and Labor; Christopher
Flarris of Bozeman; Judiciary,
Larry Jent of Bozeman, Human
Services; and Ken Peterson of
Billings, Judiciary.
These four new members of
the House join rwo MTL,A. mem-
bers who are currently members
of the Montz¡z Senate 
- 
Steve
Doherty of Great Falls and Jon
Ellingson of Missoula. .
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